The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s grand strategy to fashion a Sinocentric world order?

Chinese President Xi Jinping attends a news conference at the end of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, China. May 15, 2017. Jason Lee/Reuters


 Xi Jinping took over as the Chinese President in 2013 with a call for furthering the “Chinese Dream,” a vision for China’s development and rejuvenation.  Over the years, through his speeches, Xi has given Chinese foreign policy a new, strategic direction, including the concept of “fen fa you wei” or “striving for achievement.” This was seen as moving away from China’s long held position of “keeping a low profile, hiding your strategies, and biding your time.”  It also reflected China’s redefined “political ambition to seek global great power status and its long-term plan of reshaping the global economic structure.” [1] The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) unveiled in 2013 by Xi Jinping was a key component of this vision.

Conceived as a two-pronged plan using land and maritime routes, BRI represents one of the largest infrastructure, trade, and economic initiatives taken by a country in modern times.[2] China’s ambitious plan today connects 123 countries, touching 4.4 bn people, at an approximate cost anything between $1-4 trillion.[3] As Xi put it in a 2018 speech, he wanted BRI to “realize high-quality development, bring benefits to local people, and build a global community of shared future.” But a closer look clearly shows that China’s ultimate goal through the BRI is to become a major power and live the “China Dream” by doing the following:

1.     Provide a stimulus for the Chinese economy.[4]
2.     Offload excess capacity (steel, cement, aluminium, etc.) to BRI countries, most of them being developing economies in need of infrastructure.[5] 
3.     Create a global market for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Chinese SOEs contracted about half of BRI projects by number and more than 70% by project value.[6]
4.     Secure China’s borders and create alternative routes in case of potential military clashes in disputed the South and East China Seas or territorial conflicts with neighbours. 
5.     Secure its energy security.  China alone will account for around 40 per cent of the world energy demand rise from 2011 to 2025 and for some 31 per cent between 2011 and 2035.  Committed to reducing its dependence on coal, China hopes to meet its energy demands through natural gas imports along BRI routes.

Given the scale and unprecedentedness of this initiative, the BRI is widely seen as a clearly-defined, top-down ‘grand strategy’, reflecting Beijing’s growing ambition to reshape, or even dominate, regional and international order, putting China at the center of the world – a Sino-centric world.[7] While BRI addresses major domestic issues, it has become a euphemism for China’s foreign policy.  However, questions have been raised about it being China’s “grand strategy.”  Let us look at some of these questions.

a.      Despite the centralization of foreign policymaking under Xi Jinping, there is a lot of ambiguity regarding BRI and its stated objectives, with no practical blueprint yet.[8] In fact, there was such widespread misunderstanding about the BRI that China’s state-run Xinhua News Agency had to issue an executive order in 2017 banning the use of “BRI strategy” in all public media outlets![9]
b.     The Xi Jinping has championed the cause of multilateralism and multipolarity for a win-win cooperation.  However, the BRI has been likened to creating ‘spheres of influence’ over its partners, raising questions about China trying to be a neo-colonial power. 
c.      China’s BRI projects have been criticized for dubious practices that have impacted partner countries. The Initiative has partner countries “in a debt trap that leaves them vulnerable to China’s influence.”[10] A 2018 report from the Center for Global Development cautioned that warned that 23 of the 68 Belt and Road countries were “significantly or highly vulnerable to debt distress.” [11]
d.     European Union countries have also criticized BRI for hampering free trade and giving unfair advantages to Chinese companies in contracts awarded in the BRI partner countries.  Countries have even threatened to cancel contracts because of the financial burden imposed by some of the BRI projects.  

While it perhaps claims to meet several foreign and domestic policy goals, the BRI at this point of time appears to be a set of loose policies strung together than a ‘grand strategy.’  In fact, the way China has gone about it seems to contradict several pronouncements made by President Xi through his speeches on multiple occasions.  The desire to find solutions to its overcapacity problem through newer markets and securing trade routes, may lead to further distortions in the Chinese economy. The suspicion that it has raised in the minds of countries like India, Japan, United States and several of its BRI partners, has also created a counter-response, which only paints China as a threat, unwilling to play by a rules-based world order. 

China has become more active in its multilateral diplomacy initiatives in order to make its presence felt at international fora and expand its influence; however, it faces several challenges and constraints.  Take for example Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS).  China seems to hold greater clout within this grouping of nations due its size and economic power.  While cooperation between the BRICS nations may have increased, China’s BRI has also created friction with member countries like India.  So while China may be interested in creating stronger multilateral organizations for its own interests, there are limitations what Chinese power can do within such international combines.       

China may have a plan to grow its influence that positions itself at the center of the world; but for now, it will have to step back and give a serious look at the challenges thrown up by its adversaries and the lacunae within its own approach.  Till then the BRI will merely remain a strong foreign policy tool.



[1] Chen Gang, “The Diplomatic Thought at the Source of China’s “Belt and Road” Strategy”, Lianhe Zaobao, 25 May 2017.  http://beltandroad.zaobao.com/beltandroad/analysis/story20170525-764119 (Accessed on March 21, 2020)
[2] BRI aimed to “promote the connectivity of Asian, European and African continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all-dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development in these countries.”  “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” jointly issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization, March 28, 2015, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cevn/chn/sghkt/t1251121.htm.
[3] Inside China's Plan to Create a Modern Silk Road, A report by Morgan Stanley, March 14, 2018.
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/china-belt-and-road
[4] Trade with BRI partner countries totalled 9.27 trillion yuan (about $1.34 trillion) in 2019. The Economic Times, January 15, 2020. shorturl.at/kpyJ1
[5] Pan Zhengqi, Strategic Linkages: China’s Belt and Road Initiative and power capture through global value chains”. In Chay Yue Wah, Thomas Menkhoff, Linda Low (eds.), China's Belt And Road Initiative: Understanding The Dynamics Of A Global Transformation, World Scientific, Singapore, 2019. p. 233
[6] Denghua Zhang Jianwen Yin, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative, from the inside looking out,” The Interpreter, A Lowy Institute Daily, July 2, 2019, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/china-s-belt-and-road-initiative-inside-looking-out 
[7] Nadège Rolland, China's Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative, Seattle, WA, and Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017.   
[8] According to statistics, nearly 49,000 academic articles on the BRI were published between 2014 and 2017, giving different definitions to the BRI, whether it is an “initiative,” “strategy,” or “policy.”             
[9] Zhexin Zhang, “The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s New Geopolitical Strategy?”, China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 04, No. 03, pp. 335 (2018)
[10] Brahma Chellaney, China’s Debt Trap Diplomacy, Project Syndicate, Jan 23, 2017. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-loans-debt-by-brahma-chellaney-2017-01
[11] John Hurley , Scott Morris and Gailyn Portelance, Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, Center for Global development, March 4, 2018. https://www.cgdev.org/publication/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-a-policy-perspective

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